Histor · Guided tour

A supervised run at an HPC centre

Ten steps through the console an AI Act regulatory sandbox supervisor uses: one participation of a point-of-sale age estimator, from the signed plan to an evidence bundle anyone can verify offline. Each step opens the console page it is about.

Recorded on a simulated HPC centre with synthetic data. The Slurm scheduler and the container runtime were simulated; the model ran in a loopback-only network namespace, and the key release, scoring, ledger, report and verifier are the product's own. Identities are fictional and keys are development keys.

1. 01The plan, and who signed it

   Before anything runs, the authority and the provider sign one digest over the plan: the tests and thresholds, the pinned images, the held-out set and the HPC centre with its confidentiality undertaking. Change one threshold and the digest changes, so the rules cannot move once a result is known.

2. 02The evidence bundle, assembling

   The dashboard is the exit report's eleven sections, each filled from the ledger as the participation goes, and the bundle panel says what is sealed and what would stop it sealing. A supervisor sees what is missing before it is late.

3. 03The run at the HPC centre

   Each run is one exclusive Slurm job: the model in a network namespace with only loopback, the harness reaching it only through the relay's socket. The labels never go to the centre; the scorer keeps them and scores the answers here.

4. 04Isolation evidence, and whose word it is

   The run's keys were sealed to the job only after its measured images and a probe from the model's namespace matched the ledger. The claim over the job record is signed, and the page says who signed it: here the sandbox operator, which is weaker than the centre's own signature.

5. 05Run 1: a breach, by group

   The provider's first model accepted most minors in skin-tone band V-VI as adults, against a plan limit of 1%. It was never told anyone's group; the disparity was found from its outputs alone.

6. 06A dataset swap, refused

   A different held-out set was offered under the same id. The gate refused it, and the refusal is a hash-chained ledger entry like any other, listed under incidents and denials: what was denied is evidence too.

7. 07Run 2: the fixed model passes

   The provider shipped a fix, both parties signed an amendment pinning the new image, and run 2 passed every test. Run 1 still cites the plan version it was judged under.

8. 08Exit: the keys are destroyed

   At exit the data key, each run's work key and the harness's and scorer's signing keys are destroyed. The sealed test data can never be read again, and nothing more can be signed as this participation.

9. 09The exit report

   The Article 57(7) exit report, generated from the ledger and signed. Every number in it can be traced to a signed attestation.

10. 10Verify it offline

    Anyone with the bundle can re-derive every claim with no network and no data. The verifier also says plainly what the bundle does not establish.

Read-only: every action in the console (signing, suspending, halting, exiting, verifying) is disabled here. Viewed as the notified body, a role that may read everything and act on nothing. Open the dashboard to explore freely.